A Game-Theoretic Framework for Coupling Behavioral Dynamics with Compartmental Epidemiological Models: An Overview

Abstract

Classical compartmental models of infectious diseases, such as SIR model and its extensions, often assume that intervention-related parameters are fixed and independent of population behavior.  However, in real epidemic settings, the uptake of interventions like, vaccination, hand hygiene, and isolation is highly influenced by individual decision-making. This study presents a structured game-theoretic approach for coupling behavioral dynamics with compartmental disease models. The framework outlines the steps in the construction of payoff functions that capture the interplay between intervention costs and disease risk and their dependence on the disease prevalence. These payoff structures are incorporated with epidemiological models through evolutionary game theory, yielding coupled systems in which disease dynamics and behavioral changes evolve. Through an illustrative example based on the classical SIR model, the steady-state behavior of the coupled system is interpreted using the concept of Nash equilibrium. Unlike classical compartmental models that uses fixed intervention parameters, the coupled framework accounts for adaptive behavior changes and provides a procedure for integrating decision-making into infectious disease models. By giving a clear outline of the steps involved in disease-behavior coupling, this overview provides a guide for developing adaptive behavioral disease models and enhances the design and evaluation of effective public health intervention strategies.